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A Process Model of Affect Misattribution

B. Keith Payne

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Deborah L. Hall

Arizona State University

C. Daryl Cameron

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Anthony J. Bishara

College of Charleston

Abstract

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People often misattribute the causes of their thoughts and feelings. We propose a multinomial process model of affect misattributions, which separates three component processes. The first is an affective response to the true cause of affect. The second is an affective response to the apparent cause. The third process is when the apparent source is confused for the real source. The model is validated using the Affect Misattribution Procedure, which uses misattributions as a means to implicitly measure attitudes. The model illuminates not only the AMP, but also other phenomena in which researchers wish to model the processes underlying misattributions using subjective judgments.

A Process Model of Affect Misattribution

The origin of our thoughts and feelings is all too often a mystery. It is important to solve, because the meaning of those thoughts and feelings depends upon their source. For example, when someone feels unhappy, it is important to know whether the feeling of unhappiness is caused by her job, her marriage, or a rainy day. The changes she might make would be very different. Yet experiences do not come complete with return addresses, and so people must make inferences about their causes. When those inferences are mistaken, interesting illusions follow.

Misattributions are sometimes responsible for false memories, as when eyewitnesses confuse the suggestion of an interrogator for memories of an actual event (Loftus, 1975). The Déjà vu experience may result from a different sort of misattribution, in which a scene is processed fluently because of an initial quick glance, and that fluency is misattributed to having experienced the event before (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Brown & Marsh, 2009). Wegner (2002) has proposed that the experience of conscious will is a similar misattribution, in which conscious thoughts preceding actions are mistaken for the true causes of action, which are typically unconscious.

Beyond these cognitive illusions, misattributions have been used to explain affective biases, such as the tendency to express greater life satisfaction on sunny days than on rainy days (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). In related research on the misattribution of arousal, subjects were more aroused by erotic films if they had recently exercised (Cantor, Zillman, & Jennings, 1975), and hikers were more attracted to an experimenter after crossing a precarious footbridge than before crossing it (Dutton & Aron, 1974). This kind of misattribution may underlie the tendency to make more cautious decisions after experiencing incidental fear (Beer, Knight, & D'Esposito, 2006; Lerner & Keltner, 2001), more risky decisions following experiences of anger (Lerner &

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3 Keltner, 2001), and more severe moral judgments after experiencing irrelevant disgust (Schnall,
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5 Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). Understanding the mechanisms behind misattributions is an
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7 important step toward explaining how people can become confused about what they feel, why
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9 they feel that way, and what it means for how they should act.
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13 In this paper we develop a multinomial model for separating the processes underlying
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15 misattributions, with a focus on misattributions of affect. We begin our analysis by observing
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17 that any misattribution involves three elements. First, there is the true cause of the thought or
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19 feeling. Second, there is the apparent cause. And third, there is the mistaking of one for the other.
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21 For example, in Schwarz and Clore's (1983) study subjects were called either on a sunny day or
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23 a rainy day (the actual cause of the subjects' feelings) and they were asked about how their daily
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25 lives were going (the apparent cause). When subjects' attention was drawn to the real cause by
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27 first asking how the weather was, the weather did not influence judgments. But when there was
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29 no mention of the weather, it affected judgments of life satisfaction (a misattribution of the
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31 apparent cause for the real cause).
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37 Formal models have been developed for the study of attributions in memory (Batchelder
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39 & Reifer, 1990; Jacoby, Bishara, Hessels, & Toth, 2005). However, these models presuppose
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41 correct and incorrect responses, and they are designed to model accuracy data. No similar models
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43 have been developed for subjective judgments such as life satisfaction, risky decisions, moral
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45 judgments, attitudes, and other such judgments of interest for social and personality psychology.
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47 We validate the model using the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP), which uses affect
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49 misattributions as a means to measure automatic influences of attitudes (Payne, Cheng, Govorun,
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51 & Stewart, 2005). This provides an opportunity not only to model affect misattributions in
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53 subjective judgments, but also to apply the model to advance implicit attitude measurement.
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The Affect Misattribution Procedure

The AMP relies on the fact that people have difficulty disentangling their affective responses to two events occurring in close proximity in time and space. When this happens, people confuse the sources of their affective responses. Murphy and Zajonc (1993) presented affectively charged pictures too briefly to be identified, followed by Chinese pictographs that subjects rated for pleasantness. They found that ratings of the pictographs were influenced by the valence of the prime photos. Payne and colleagues (2005) modified this paradigm by presenting the prime photos visibly, and by using a binary judgment of pleasantness to maximize the ambiguity of the judgment. In addition, they added a direct warning to subjects to avoid any influence of the primes on their judgments. This instruction was intended to place intentionally controlled response strategies in opposition to automatic influences of the primes. To the extent that subjects are able to strategically avoid the influence of the prime, they should show no priming effects. But to the extent that primes affect responding despite intentions, the task provides evidence for automatic influences, counter to control attempts.

Evidence for construct validity comes from studies showing that the AMP is significantly related to explicit attitude measures, but only in the absence of motivations to control responses. Such motivations tend to distort explicit measures but leave AMP scores relatively unaffected (Gawronski, Peters, Brochu, & Strack, 2008; Imhoff & Banse, 2009; Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008; Payne, Govorun, & Arbuckle, 2008). Predictive validity has been established in studies showing that AMP scores predict judgment and behavioral outcomes after controlling for explicit measures in studies of alcohol drinking (Payne, Govorun, & Arbuckle, 2008), smoking (Payne, McClernon, & Dobbins, 2007) and the influence of racial prejudice on voting in the 2008 presidential election (Payne et al., 2009). The AMP provides an ideal paradigm for studying

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3 affect misattributions because it elicits robust misattribution effects in a within-subjects design
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5 that provides high statistical power for testing the fit of the proposed model. In addition,
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7 applying the model to the AMP provides a useful means for separating automatic affective
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9 responses toward the primes from other component responses. Disentangling these processes
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11 helps refine implicit measures of social cognition.
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14 15 Disentangling Processes Underlying Implicit Tests 16

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18 A number of formal models, such as the Process Dissociation Procedure, have been used
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20 to estimate the contribution of automatic and controlled processes to implicit task performance
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22 (Jacoby, 1991; Payne, 2001). Related models include the Quadruple Process Model (Quad
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24 model; Conrey et al., 2005), and the diffusion model of Klauer and colleagues (Klauer, Voss,
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26 Schmitz, & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007; for discussions of the relationships between these models,
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28 see Bishara & Payne, 2009; Payne & Bishara, 2009). Formal models of this type have helped
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30 clarify a number of theoretical questions. For example, Govorun and Payne (2006) found that
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32 participants showed more race bias on an implicit task when their self-control resources were
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34 depleted. This finding presents a puzzle for perspectives that view implicit tests as reflecting
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36 purely automatic responses. Why, after all, should depleting self-control resources influence a
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38 purely automatic effect? A process dissociation analysis revealed that the effect of depletion was
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40 mediated by reductions in the controlled component of task performance. Self-control depletion
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42 did not increase automatic prejudice, but instead it interfered with the ability to prevent that
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44 prejudice from influencing behavior (see also Amodio, 2009; Amodio et al., 2004; Lambert et
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46 al., 2003).
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53 Quantitative models have also clarified the sources of group differences in implicit test
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55 performance. It has frequently been observed that Whites show more anti-Black implicit bias
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3 than Blacks do, and that older adults show more bias than younger adults do. It might be
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5 tempting to assume the same explanation for both of these effects: that Whites and older people
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7 are simply more prejudiced against Blacks. But the results of studies using process models have
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9 shown that the two effects are driven by distinct mechanisms. Stewart, von Hippel, and
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11 Radvanski (2009) used process dissociation to compare age and race differences in implicit bias.
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13 Older adults showed poorer control than young adults, but they did not differ in automatic race
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15 bias. In contrast, the difference in implicit test scores for White and Black respondents was
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17 driven entirely by differences in automatic attitudes (see also Gonsalkorale, Sherman, & Klauer
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19 2009). These studies suggest that age differences in implicit prejudice reflect age-related declines
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21 in cognitive control, whereas differences between racial groups reflect different automatic
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23 responses.
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29 As with models of memory attributions, the models developed for implicit attitude
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31 measures are limited to certain kinds of outcomes. Process dissociation and Quad models have
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33 been developed for compatibility tasks in which the outcome is accuracy. Klauer and colleagues'
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35 (2007) diffusion model can be used with accuracy and response time data. However, none of the
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37 currently available process models are appropriate for use with subjective judgments. The model
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39 proposed here is validated using the AMP, but it is intended to apply to the wide range of
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41 misattribution phenomena in which outcomes are subjective judgments.
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46 A Model for Separating Component Processes in Affect Misattribution

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48 We formulated a multinomial model, which represents unobserved cognitive processes in
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50 a branching tree diagram. Each process is represented as a probability, which can be interpreted
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52 as the likelihood that the process contributes to behavioral responses. The tree diagram depicts
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54 the set of conditional probabilities that together are posited by the model to produce the observed
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3 patterns of responses. Because the behavioral responses are empirical data gathered in an
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5 experiment, the model allows researchers to solve the set of joint probability equations. The
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7 model's parameters are then compared to the data using a goodness of fit test to assess how well
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9 the model fits the data.
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13 To understand the model, it is important to note that subjects are instructed to evaluate
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15 the pictographs without influence from the prime photos. The model claims that whenever
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17 subjects are successful at distinguishing their response to the prime from their response to the
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19 pictograph, the response is driven by their evaluation of the pictograph. But when subjects
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21 confuse their reaction to the prime with their reaction to the pictograph, the response is driven by
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23 the reaction to the prime.
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28 The model depicted in Figure 1 assumes that for any judgment, a misattribution occurs
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30 with probability M , or it does not occur with probability $1-M$. The misattribution parameter in
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32 this model shares some similarity with the control parameter (C) in process dissociation models,
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34 in that misattribution reflects a failure to carry out the intended task by distinguishing between
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36 relevant cues (the pictograph) and irrelevant cues (the prime). However, the parameter is
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38 different in the sense that no speeded compatibility task is involved. Failures presumably occur
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40 because of an inability to distinguish the source of one's affect, rather than because of a failure to
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42 resolve interference in a speeded test. If a misattribution occurs, then the response is driven by
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44 affect toward the prime. The affective response is favorable with probability A (positive affect
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46 toward the prime) or unfavorable with probability $1-A$. If no misattribution occurs, the response
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48 is driven by evaluations of the pictograph. The evaluation is favorable with probability P or
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50 unfavorable with probability $1-P$. The model proposes that the A , M , and P parameters are
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52 sufficient to describe performance on the AMP. These parameters correspond to our general
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3 analysis of misattributions, in that A represents affective responses to the prime (the true cause of
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5 affect), P represents evaluations of the pictograph (the apparent cause of affect), and M
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8 represents confusing one for the other.
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10 At least two criteria are important in evaluating models. First, the model must provide a
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12 good statistical fit to the data. And second, the model must produce theoretically meaningful
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14 process estimates. That is, the process estimates should be influenced by variables in ways that
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16 are theoretically predicted. In the model tests reported below, we manipulated variables expected
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18 to selectively influence individual parameters as a means of validating the model. To evaluate
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20 the model, we tested whether the model could successfully recover evaluations of the primes
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22 when the pictographs were presented slowly, thus reducing the likelihood of making a
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24 misattribution. In the first experiment, we used clearly pleasant and unpleasant primes to test
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26 whether the model could accurately estimate known affective reactions to the primes. In the
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28 second experiment, we tested whether estimates of affective reactions to the primes could predict
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30 individual differences in behavioral intentions as well or better than relying on task performance
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32 alone.
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38 Experiment 1

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40 In this experiment we examined the validity of the model by manipulating the
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42 pleasantness of the primes using photos that were normatively liked (e.g., puppies) and disliked
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44 (e.g., snakes). We also manipulated the likelihood of making a misattribution by varying the time
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46 for which the pictograph was presented. Prior research demonstrated that affective priming was
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48 reduced when the pictograph was presented for long durations (e.g., Payne et al., 2005). When
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50 the pictograph is presented slowly, respondents can presumably focus more on the features of the
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52 pictograph itself, and better distinguish between their affective reactions to the pictographs as
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3 opposed to the primes. Finally, we manipulated the likelihood that subjects liked the pictograph
4 themselves by selecting pictographs that tended to be more or less liked based on pre-testing. If
5 the model is valid, then the pleasantness of the primes should selectively influence the A
6 parameter. The pictograph presentation time should selectively influence the M parameter. And
7 the pleasantness of pictographs should selectively influence the P parameter. Critically, once the
8 model is used to account for differences in misattributions (M), the presentation time of the
9 pictographs should not influence affective reactions toward the primes (A). That is, although
10 long presentation times are expected to obscure the effects of the primes in task performance, the
11 model should be able to recover affective responses to the primes independent of the presentation
12 rate.
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26 Method

27 *Participants*

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29 Sixty-eight undergraduate students (24 men and 44 women) participated in the study for
30 partial course credit.
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36 *Procedure*

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38 Upon arrival at the lab, participants were seated at a computer and introduced to the
39 computer-based affect misattribution procedure. On each trial of the AMP, a pleasant or
40 unpleasant photo (the prime) appeared on the center of the computer screen for 75 ms, followed
41 by a Chinese pictograph, whose duration was manipulated as described below. Following the
42 pictograph, a black-and-white pattern mask was presented that appeared as “static.” The mask
43 remained on the screen until participants indicated a pleasant or unpleasant response, at which
44 point the next trial began. Participants were instructed to try their absolute best to ignore the
45 photo and to sort each pictograph into the more pleasant half or the less pleasant half by pressing
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3 two keys marked “pleasant” and “unpleasant.” The task consisted of 48 trials, plus one practice
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5 trial to demonstrate the trial sequence. Following the AMP, participants completed some
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7 demographic measures, indicated whether they could read the pictographs (none could) and were
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9 debriefed about the purpose of the study.
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12 *Design and Materials*

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15 The design of the study was a 2 (Prime: pleasant vs. unpleasant) X 2 (Pictograph:
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17 pleasant vs. unpleasant) X 2 (Pictograph duration: 100 ms vs. 1000 ms) mixed design, with the
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19 duration of the pictograph manipulated between-subjects and the other factors manipulated
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21 within-subjects.
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25 *Chinese pictographs.* To measure the pleasantness of the pictographs we used data from a
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27 pilot study.¹ The purpose of the pictographs is to serve as affectively neutral stimuli, to which
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29 feelings toward the primes may be misattributed. In manipulating the pleasantness of the
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31 pictographs, it was important not to use items that were so clearly pleasant or unpleasant that
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33 they would no longer be considered ambiguous. We therefore selected items whose pleasantness
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35 ratings were just slightly above or below average ratings. The overall average proportion of
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37 pleasant ratings was 57%; the more pleasant set were rated 64% pleasant and the less pleasant set
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39 were 51% pleasant.
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44 *Affective primes.* Twenty-four positive images and 24 negative images were selected
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46 from the International Affective Picture System to serve as affective primes (Lang, Bradley &
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48 Cuthbert, 1997). Each image in the database had been rated on a 1-9 pleasantness scale, with the
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50 pleasant items averaging 7.88 and the unpleasant items averaging 3.33.
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53 Results

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3 The main hypothesis was that the duration of the Chinese pictographs would moderate
4 the impact of primes versus pictographs on responses. Primes were expected to have a larger
5 impact when the duration was short, compared to when it was long. But the pleasantness of the
6 pictograph itself was expected to have a larger impact when the duration was long. For purposes
7 of implicit attitude measurement, these effects are nuisance variables that interfere with the
8 ability to assess automatic affective responses to the primes. However, it was expected that
9 parameter estimates derived from the multinomial model should uncover affective responses to
10 the primes, uncontaminated by features of the pictographs and independent of their duration. By
11 separating the influence of the primes from the influence of the pictographs, the model was
12 expected to reveal lower rates of misattribution (not less intense affective responses to the
13 primes) in the long presentation condition. We first report the behavioral results, followed by the
14 model testing.

31 *Affective Priming in Behavioral Responses*

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34 Priming was scored by computing the percentage of pleasant responses to the pictographs
35 in each condition. Results were analyzed using a 2 (Prime: pleasant vs. unpleasant) X 2
36 (Pictograph: pleasant vs. unpleasant) X 2 (Pictograph duration: fast vs. slow) analysis of variance
37 (ANOVA). As expected, the main effect of Prime pleasantness was significant, indicating that
38 overall, the pictographs were rated more pleasant when they were preceded by pleasant primes
39 than unpleasant primes, $F(1, 66) = 30.37, p < .001$. In addition, a significant main effect of
40 Pictograph pleasantness confirmed that pleasant pictographs were rated as more pleasant than
41 unpleasant pictographs, $F(1,66) = 51.21, p < .001$. These main effects were qualified by two
42 predicted interactions. As displayed in Figure 2, Prime pleasantness had a stronger effect when
43 the pictographs were presented quickly, $F(1, 34) = 20.57, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .38$, than when they
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3 were presented slowly, $F(1, 32) = 10.53, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .25$. The expected Prime pleasantness X
4 Pictograph duration interaction was marginally significant, $F(1, 66) = 3.60, p = .06$.
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8 The duration manipulation had the opposite effect for pictograph pleasantness. As
9 displayed in Figure 3, Pictograph pleasantness had a larger impact when the pictographs were
10 presented slowly, $F(1, 32) = 55.16, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .63$, than when they were presented quickly,
11 $F(1, 34) = 4.88, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .13$. The Pictograph pleasantness X Pictograph duration interaction
12 was significant, $F(1, 66) = 18.66, p < .001$. To summarize, these patterns suggest that as the
13 duration became longer, the influence of the primes diminished and the influence of the
14 pictograph features increased.
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24 In addition to these predicted effects, there was also an unanticipated Prime pleasantness
25 X Pictograph pleasantness X Pictograph duration interaction, $F(1, 66) = 4.98, p < .05$. We resist
26 drawing conclusions from this interaction because it did not replicate in Experiment 2. But for
27 completeness, the full pattern of means is displayed in Table 1. This interaction indicates that
28 when the pictographs were presented quickly, Prime pleasantness and Pictograph pleasantness
29 had additive effects, with no interaction, $F(1, 34) = 2.06, p = .16$. But when the pictographs were
30 presented slowly, there was a marginally significant interaction between Prime pleasantness and
31 Pictograph pleasantness, $F(1, 32) = 2.88, p = .10$. In the slow duration condition, Prime valence
32 had a somewhat larger effect on evaluations of pleasant pictographs, $F(1, 32) = 11.43, p < .01,$
33 $\eta_p^2 = .26$, compared to unpleasant pictographs, $F(1, 32) = 3.30, p = .08, \eta_p^2 = .09$. This
34 interaction reflects a difference in the magnitude of priming effects, rather than a qualitative
35 difference, because affective priming was present (at marginally significant levels) even in the
36 slow-duration/unpleasant pictograph condition.
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55 *Tests of the Multinomial Model*
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3 We fitted the multinomial model to the data from Experiment 1 and tested the model fit
4 using a G^2 statistic. The equations that make up the model are included in the appendix. We
5 began by fitting a saturated model that had a unique A, M, and P parameter for every cell in the
6 2x2x2 design. (The saturated model cannot be tested because it has more parameters than data
7 cells, and hence no degrees of freedom). We then constrained the parameters based on theoretical
8 assumptions and examined whether the model continued to fit under these constraints.
9 Specifically, we allowed M to vary across short versus long symbol duration, but not across
10 pleasant versus unpleasant primes or pleasant versus unpleasant pictographs. Second, we allowed
11 A to vary across pleasant and unpleasant primes, but constrained it to be equal across pleasant
12 and unpleasant pictographs, and long versus short duration. Finally, we allowed P to vary across
13 pleasant versus unpleasant symbols, but constrained it to be equal across prime and duration
14 conditions. The model constrained in this way tests whether each parameter can be cleanly
15 dissociated from the other parameters. We refer to this particular set of parameter constraints as
16 the "model of interest" and focus on it as a point of comparison.
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36 The model of interest fit the data well, $G^2(2) = 4.29, p > .05$; critical value = 5.99. As
37 displayed in Table 2, the parameter estimates showed the expected patterns. To determine which
38 manipulations significantly influenced parameter estimates, we examined a series of nested
39 models with additional parameter constraints. Compared to the model of interest, constraining
40 the M parameter to be the same across durations led to a significant increase in G^2 , $\Delta G^2(1) =$
41 49.86, $p < .001$. In other words, the misattribution rate, M, was significantly higher when the
42 pictographs were presented quickly than when presented slowly. Furthermore, positive affect
43 toward the prime, A, was significantly higher when the prime was pleasant than when it was
44 unpleasant, $\Delta G^2(1) = 124.69, p < .001$. Finally, liking for the pictographs, P, was significantly
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3 higher for the pleasant pictographs than for the unpleasant pictographs, $\Delta G^2(1) = 120.10$, $p <$
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7 .001.

8 In order to further examine the constraints in the model of interest, it was also compared
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10 to models where the constraints were loosened. For example, when A for the unpleasant prime
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12 was allowed to vary separately for slow and fast durations, the model fit did not significantly
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14 improve, $\Delta G^2(1) < .01$, $p > .99$. In other words, A for the unpleasant prime was not significantly
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16 influenced by duration. Likewise, relaxing any of the other individual parameter constraints in
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18 the model of interest failed to significantly improve model fit, all $\Delta G^2(1) < 3.24$, all $ps > .05$.
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20 Even if two parameter constraints were relaxed simultaneously, the fit of the model of interest
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22 was so good that it was impossible to significantly improve the fit, all $\Delta G^2(2) < 4.29$, all $ps > .05$.
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27 Discussion

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29 Results of Experiment 1 suggest that the proposed multinomial model successfully
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31 captured the processes underlying performance in the Affect Misattribution Procedure. The
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33 model fit the data well and the pattern of estimates derived from the model showed theoretically
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35 predicted patterns. Considering behavioral responses, faster presentation allowed greater
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37 influence of the primes, but slower presentation allowed greater influence of the pictographs.
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39 The model successfully explained these differences as resulting from different rates of
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41 misattribution in the fast versus slow presentation conditions. Compared to the model, behavioral
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43 performance underestimated the size of the affective priming effect, particularly in the slow
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45 presentation condition. The difference between behavioral responses and model estimates in the
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47 long presentation condition can be accounted for by the higher rate of misattributions when the
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49 pictograph presentation was fast.
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These results suggest that when the pictograph was presented slowly, the primes were not evaluated any differently; instead, their impact on evaluations of the pictograph was masked because judgments were then based heavily on the qualities of the pictograph itself. By applying the model, we were able to correct for this masking effect and recover the underlying affective reactions to the primes. Having demonstrated that the model can adequately explain affective priming data, we next tested whether the model could uncover individual differences in attitudes that were predictive of behavior.

Experiment 2

In this experiment, we sought to replicate the main finding of Experiment 1, that the model could separate affective reactions to primes from the influences of the pictographs and misattribution rates. However, rather than examining unanimously pleasant and unpleasant items, we examined individual differences in attitudes. We took advantage of the 2008 U.S. Presidential election to test whether automatic responses toward the candidates would predict voting intentions. Previous research has shown that implicit and explicit responses toward political candidates tend to be strongly related (Nosek, 2005; Payne et al., 2005). As a result, we could examine the relationship between implicit responses and self-reported voting intentions without accounting for social desirability or other factors that interfere with self-reports of behavioral intentions. Data were collected in the weeks immediately before the election.

Methods

Participants

Fifty-five undergraduate students (11 males and 44 females) participated in the study for partial course credit.

Procedure and Design

Participants were recruited to take part in a study on political attitudes. After demographic information was collected, subjects were asked for whom they intended to vote. The options included Barack Obama, John McCain, and “another candidate.” All subjects expressed an intention to vote for either Obama or McCain.

Next, a version of the AMP was administered in which photographs of John McCain and Barack Obama served as the primes. On each of 60 trials, a photograph of either McCain or Obama appeared on the screen for 75 ms, followed by a blank screen for 125 ms, a Chinese pictograph, and then a black-and-white pattern mask. Participants were instructed that the prime photos could influence their judgments and they were warned to try their absolute best not to let the photos affect their pleasantness judgments of the pictographs. The presentation duration of the Chinese pictographs was manipulated between-subjects (100 ms or 1000 ms). The candidate photos and the pleasantness of the Chinese pictographs were manipulated within-subjects, yielding a 2 (Prime: McCain vs. Obama) X 2 (Pictograph pleasantness: pleasant vs. unpleasant) X 2 (Pictograph duration: short vs. long) mixed design.

Materials

The same pictograph selections as in Experiment 1 were used to manipulate the pleasantness of the target items. We first selected photos of the candidates based on a pilot test. Selected photos were judged to be typical of how the candidates normally look, and they were matched to minimize differences in attractiveness.² The final materials included 8 matched photos of each candidate.

Results

No participants indicated that they knew the semantic meaning of the Chinese pictographs. One participant's response times to the AMP were more than three standard deviations longer than the mean response time, and this subject's data were excluded from analyses.

Behavioral Responses

Voting intentions were very close to actual election results, with 53% of subjects intending to vote for Obama and 47% intending to vote for McCain (Obama won the popular vote by 53% to 46%). We recoded the candidate primes based on voting intentions to reflect each subject's selected candidate and rejected candidate. We then analyzed the proportion of pleasant responses on the AMP using a 2 (Prime: selected vs. rejected candidate) X 2 (Pictograph pleasantness: pleasant vs. unpleasant) X 2 (Pictograph duration: fast vs. slow) ANOVA. We expected responses to the candidate primes to be consistent with voting intentions, and that this difference would be larger when pictographs were presented quickly. In addition, we expected that pictograph pleasantness would have a larger impact when the pictographs were presented slowly.

As predicted, a significant main effect of the candidate Prime indicated that the selected candidate primed more positive responses than the rejected candidate, $F(1, 53) = 16.33, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .24$. This effect demonstrates that AMP responses were consistent with voting intentions.³ Also as expected, the predictive validity of the AMP was qualified by the duration of the pictograph: Prime x Pictograph duration, $F(1, 53) = 4.26, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .07$ (see Figure 4). Simple effects tests showed that the main effect of selected versus rejected candidate primes was

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3 significant in the fast condition, $F(1, 26) = 12.84, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .33$, but only marginally
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5 significant in the slow condition, $F(1, 27) = 3.37, p = .08, \eta_p^2 = .11$.
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8 In addition, subjects responded more favorably to pleasant pictographs than unpleasant
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10 pictographs, $F(1, 53) = 15.16, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .22$. This effect was moderated by Pictograph
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12 duration, $F(1, 53) = 4.26, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .07$ (see Figure 5). Pictograph pleasantness had a
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14 significant effect when pictographs were presented slowly, $F(1, 27) = 13.02, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .33$,
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16 but only a marginally significant effect when presented quickly, $F(1, 26) = 2.75, p = .10$. These
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18 effects demonstrate that priming responses were consistent with behavioral intentions, but that
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20 the predictive validity of the AMP was greater when the pictographs were presented quickly.
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22 When they were presented slowly, the pleasantness of the pictographs had greater impact,
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24 replicating Experiment 1.
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28 29 *Tests of the Multinomial Model*

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31 We fitted the model using the same procedure as in Experiment 1, by first estimating a
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33 fully saturated model and then constraining the parameters based on theoretical predictions. As
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35 in Experiment 1, we constrained the model such that the M parameter was allowed to vary only
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37 between long and short pictograph presentations; the P parameter was allowed to vary only
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39 between pleasant and unpleasant pictographs; and the A parameter was allowed to vary only for
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41 selected and unselected candidate primes. This model of interest fit the data very well, $G^2(2) =$
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43 $.61, p > .05$, critical value = 5.99, and it generated meaningful parameter estimates, as displayed
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45 in Table 3. The A parameter was significantly higher for the selected candidate than the rejected
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47 candidate, $\Delta G^2(1) = 50.57, p < .001$. The M parameter was significantly higher for fast than slow
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49 durations, $\Delta G^2(1) = 26.80, p < .001$. Finally, the P parameter was significantly higher for
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51 pleasant pictographs than unpleasant ones, $\Delta G^2(1) = 76.01, p < .001$. Additionally, the fit of the
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3 model of interest was so good that it was impossible to significantly improve upon it by relaxing
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5 the parameter constraints, all $\Delta G^2 < .61$, all $ps > .05$.
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8 Discussion

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10 Behavioral responses in the AMP were reliably associated with voting intentions, but this
11 relationship was attenuated when the pictographs were presented slowly. If we had looked only
12 at responses under the slow presentation conditions, we might have concluded that affective
13 responses to the primes were not good predictors of attitudes or behavioral intent. However, an
14 alternative explanation is that affective responses to the primes were masked by intentional
15 evaluations of the pictographs themselves (consistent with task instructions). By this account,
16 subjects had attitude-consistent affective reactions, but these reactions did not carry over to
17 evaluations of the pictographs when the pictographs were presented slowly. By applying the
18 multinomial model, we were able to successfully remove the influence of the pictographs
19 themselves to produce a more accurate estimate of attitudes. Model estimates of affective
20 responses to the primes differentiated voters about as well as behavioral priming effects in the
21 fast presentation condition, and considerably better than behavioral responses in the slow
22 presentation condition. The evidence for this conclusion comes from the fact that for behavioral
23 responses, the preference-consistent priming effect was qualified by duration, but A was not
24 different in the fast versus slow presentation conditions. These findings suggest that the model
25 may be especially useful when studying individuals or groups who differ in vulnerability to
26 misattributions, as we discuss in more detail below.
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50 General Discussion

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52 In two experiments, we validated a new model of the processes underlying
53 misattributions in the Affect Misattribution Procedure. In Experiment 1, we used clearly pleasant
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3 and unpleasant primes to establish the meanings of each model parameter. The A parameter,
4 meant to reflect affective responses to the primes, was influenced selectively by the valence of
5 the primes. The M parameter, meant to reflect the rate of misattributions of affect from the
6 primes to the pictographs, accounted for the effects of presentation duration. Finally, the P
7 parameter, meant to reflect evaluations of the pictographs, was influenced selectively by the
8 pleasantness of the pictographs as defined by a pre-test. In Experiment 2, we applied the model
9 to individual differences in political attitudes. The model successfully distinguished subjects
10 based on their voting intentions. Here, too, the A parameter was unaffected by the duration of the
11 pictographs, showing that underlying evaluations of the primes could be recovered even when
12 they were hidden in behavioral responses.
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26 27 *Implications for the Mechanisms of Misattribution*

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29 Our model provides a new framework for studying a broad set of misattribution effects in
30 which there is no correct answer. Several phenomena of interest to social psychologists may
31 reflect a similar processing architecture. For example, classic findings on the misattribution of
32 arousal (Cantor, Zillman, & Bryant, 1975; Dutton & Aron, 1974), misattributions of emotion and
33 mood (Schachter & Singer, 1962; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), and mood as input (Martin, Ward,
34 Achee, & Wyer, 1993) seem likely to follow similar logic.
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44 The model provides a testable theoretical account of the relationships among underlying
45 processes that produce misattribution effects. That is, the model specifies a particular set of
46 contingencies in which the apparent cause only influences judgments when a misattribution
47 occurs; otherwise, the judgment is driven by the real source. Other processes and different
48 relationships between processes are possible, and could be evaluated by testing competing
49 models against each other.
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4 The model also aids in testing hypotheses about specific processes. For example, many
5 misattribution paradigms are based on the assumption that directing attention to the true source
6 of one's feelings reduces the likelihood that a misattribution will be made, whereas directing
7 attention to an apparent cause increases the likelihood of misattribution. This assumption was
8 reflected in the design of Schwarz and Clore's (1983) study, in which participants were either
9 asked about the weather *before* they reported their happiness (which prevented misattribution
10 from taking place), or attention was drawn to the weather as a potential determinant of one's
11 happiness afterwards. Yet, considering these outcomes as opposite poles of a continuum ignores
12 the possibility that misattribution, and the influences of the real and apparent causes, might
13 operate independently of each other. Does directing attention to the real cause have its effects by
14 reducing misattributions, by increasing the influence of the real cause, or by decreasing the
15 influence of the apparent cause (or a combination of these)? Applying the model to classic
16 paradigms such as misattributions of emotion (Schachter & Singer, 1962; Schwarz & Clore,
17 1983) and misattributions of arousal (Cantor, Zillman, & Bryant, 1975; Dutton & Aron, 1974)
18 would help clarify the role (or roles) of important variables such as the focus of attention and the
19 ambiguity of the situation.

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 *Implications for Implicit Measurement*

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43 In addition to advancing basic understanding of the processes driving misattributions, the
44 model provides a useful tool for improving the quality of implicit measurement. In our studies,
45 the model improved the sensitivity and predictive power of implicit attitudes measured with the
46 AMP. Estimates of A (compared to behavioral AMP scores) showed increased sensitivity to the
47 valence of primes in Experiment 1, and increased ability to differentiate Obama voters from
48 McCain voters in Experiment 2. In both studies, we manipulated the presentation rate of the
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3 pictographs as a means of influencing the likelihood of misattributions. In effect, we created an
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5 obstacle to implicit attitude measurement to test whether the model could overcome that
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7 obstacle. In most contexts, of course, researchers would not deliberately include such a
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9 manipulation, but natural obstacles to measurement are common in ordinary use.
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13 Consider the findings described in the introduction that older adults and younger adults
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15 differed in controlled components of implicit task performance (Gonsalkorale, Sherman, &
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17 Klauer, 2009; Stewart, von Hippel, & Radvanski, 2009). Given that older adults (Hashtroudi,
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19 Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1989; Henkel, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1998; Jacoby, Bishara, Hessels,
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21 & Toth, 2005) and children (Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991) often have difficulty with source
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23 attribution, it is likely that age may also influence misattributions in the AMP. The extremity of
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25 priming effects among young adults may be underestimated compared to older adults and
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27 children, but applying the process model proposed here offers a potential solution. By accounting
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29 for differences in misattribution across age groups, the model may be able to more accurately
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31 measure attitudes. Other individual differences might also moderate the degree to which AMP
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33 responses reflect purely automatic reactions. For example, individuals with good attention
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35 control and executive functioning might be better able to avoid the influence of the primes as
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37 they are instructed to do. The model developed here shows promise for removing these
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39 influences to better isolate affective reactions to the primes.
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47 An important next step is extending the model to estimate processes at the level of
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49 individual subjects. Our studies were designed to evaluate the model at the group-level, which
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51 did not allow enough degrees of freedom to test the model for individual participants. Although
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53 this is beyond the scope of the present research, individual estimates would provide more
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55 flexibility by allowing researchers to examine individual difference correlations in addition to
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3 group comparisons. However, now that the model has been validated, it should be possible to
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5 generate individual estimates by manipulating both pictograph pleasantness and pictograph
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7 duration as within-subject variables. The main consideration is to ensure that the number of data
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9 cells for each subject is greater than the number of free parameters. For example, a 2 (prime) x 2
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11 (pictograph pleasantness) x 2 (pictograph duration) within-subjects design would generate eight
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13 data cells for each subject. If two A parameters, two M parameters, and two P parameters were
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15 estimated for each subject the model would be identifiable, with two degrees of freedom.
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19 Validating such an individual-level model is an important direction for future research.
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22 Conclusion

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24 We validated a new process model of affect misattributions that successfully separated
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26 affective reactions to two sources (prime photos and target pictographs) and the likelihood of
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28 misattributing one for the other. The model can, in principle, be applied to any case of
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30 misattribution. Because people do not necessarily know the causes of their thoughts and feelings,
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32 they often confuse the causes and thus are influenced by logically irrelevant factors. When a
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34 person feels more attracted to their date because they have just watched an action movie, or
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36 when they feel unsatisfied with their life because it is rainy outside, that person is in the grip of a
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38 misattribution. Our model sheds light on exactly how subjects feel about the real cause of their
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40 reactions, how they feel about the apparent cause, and the extent to which they have confused
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42 one for the other.
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Appendix: Modeling Methods and Equations

To assure convergence on best fitting parameters and the smallest possible G^2 , multinomial models were implemented with a quasi-Newton optimization method and multiple sets of random starting parameters. This was performed using Microsoft Excel's Solver add-on. Alpha was set to .05. With this alpha, power to detect small effect sizes ($w = .1$; Cohen, 1977) always exceeded .999 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).

The following general equations were used for the model:

$$p(\text{Pleasant response}) = M \cdot A + (1-M) \cdot P \quad (\text{A1})$$

$$p(\text{Unpleasant response}) = M \cdot (1-A) + (1-M) \cdot (1-P) \quad (\text{A2})$$

Author Note

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B. Keith Payne, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Deborah L. Hall, Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Arizona State University; C. Daryl Cameron, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Anthony J. Bishara, Department of Psychology, College of Charleston, Charleston, SC. The first author acknowledges support from National Science Foundation Grant 0615478. Correspondence regarding this article may be sent to Keith Payne at payne@unc.edu.

Footnotes

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6 1. Pre-test data were from a pilot study for the American National Election Studies (ANES)
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8 which included the AMP as a measure of racial attitudes. The pilot study used a
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10 nationally representative sample of 538 American adults. The version of the AMP used in
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12 the ANES included photos of White and Black men as primes that were randomly paired
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14 with the pictographs. For the present study, we collapsed across the primes because we
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16 were interested in the average evaluation of each pictograph. The pilot study included 71
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18 unique pictographs. The rate of “pleasant” responses for the pictographs (averaged across
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20 participants) ranged from 46% to 75%, (Mean = 57%, SD = 7%). We selected 30
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22 pictographs from the upper half of this distribution, resulting in a set with an average of
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24 64% pleasant responses; and we selected 30 from the lower half of the distribution,
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26 resulting in a set with 51% pleasant responses. In this way, we selected relatively more
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28 pleasant and less pleasant pictographs that were nonetheless close to neutral ratings.
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- 34 2. The photos were pre-tested as part of an ANES pilot study. We first selected 17 photos of
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36 each candidate from internet sites. All photos showed the candidate in business attire, and
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38 the photos included a wide range to poses and background contexts. In the pilot study,
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40 160 subjects rated each photo on typicality and attractiveness. Two items measured
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42 typicality: “How unusual is this picture of [candidate]?” (answered using 5 response
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44 options from “not at all unusual” to “extremely unusual”) and “How different does
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46 [candidate] look in this picture from the way he usually looks?” (answered using 5
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48 response options from “not at all different” to “extremely different”). Two additional
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50 items measured attractiveness: “How attractive does [candidate] look in this picture?”
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52 (answered using 5 response options from “not attractive at all” to “extremely attractive”)
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3 and, “In this picture do you think [candidate] looks... (answered using 7 response options
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5 from “extremely good” to “extremely bad.” We first identified photographs that were
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7 rated highest in typicality for each candidate (i.e., those with average ratings above 3
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9 when the items were scored such that higher values represent greater typicality). This
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11 resulted in 12 typical photos of each candidate. Among typical photos, Obama’s were
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13 rated as significantly more attractive than McCain’s, $p < .05$. To reduce differences in
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15 attractiveness, we excluded the four most attractive Obama photos and the four least
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17 attractive McCain photos. This resulted in 8 photos of each candidate that were
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19 equivalently high on typicality (Obama $M = 3.31$, McCain $M = 3.30$) and relatively close
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21 on attractiveness (Obama $M = 4.21$, McCain $M = 3.98$; difference = $.23$, $p = .09$).

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27 3. A supplementary analysis treated voting intention as a between-subjects variable rather
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29 than recoding the primes as selected versus rejected candidates. This analysis revealed a
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31 significant Voting intention x Prime interaction, $p < .01$, reflecting preference-consistent
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33 priming. There was no main effect of prime, indicating that there was no net preference
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35 for either candidate. This cross-over interaction indicates that implicit preferences were
36
37 symmetrical: Obama voters displayed automatic preferences for Obama by about the
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39 same degree as McCain voters displayed automatic preferences for McCain. This
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41 symmetry justifies collapsing the preferences together into selected and rejected
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43 candidates for the purpose of model-testing.
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Table 1.

Probability of a pleasant response, Experiment 1.

	Unpleasant Prime		Pleasant Prime	
	Unpleasant Pictograph	Pleasant Pictograph	Unpleasant Pictograph	Pleasant Pictograph
Slow duration	0.39	0.61	0.46	0.77
Fast duration	0.43	0.52	0.70	0.74

Table 2. *Parameter estimates for the model of interest, Experiment 1.*

Parameter	Slow Duration			
	Unpleasant Prime		Pleasant Prime	
	Unpleasant Pictograph	Pleasant Pictograph	Unpleasant Pictograph	Pleasant Pictograph
A	0.47	0.47	0.74	0.74
M	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43
P	0.29	0.75	0.29	0.75
Parameter	Fast Duration			
	Unpleasant Prime		Pleasant Prime	
	Unpleasant Pictograph	Pleasant Pictograph	Unpleasant Pictograph	Pleasant Pictograph
A	0.47	0.47	0.74	0.74
M	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87
P	0.29	0.75	0.29	0.75

Note. A = positive affect toward prime; M = misattribution rate; P = evaluation of pictograph.

Table 3. *Parameter estimates for the model of interest, Experiment 2.*

Parameter	Slow Duration			
	Prime: rejected candidate		Prime: selected candidate	
	Unpleasant Pictograph	Pleasant Pictograph	Unpleasant Pictograph	Pleasant Pictograph
A	.45	.45	.67	.67
M	.25	.25	.25	.25
P	.41	.68	.41	.68
Parameter	Fast Duration			
	Prime: rejected candidate		Prime: selected candidate	
	Unpleasant Pictograph	Pleasant Pictograph	Unpleasant Pictograph	Pleasant Pictograph
A	.45	.45	.67	.67
M	.77	.77	.77	.77
P	.41	.68	.41	.68

Note. A = positive affect toward prime; M = misattribution rate; P = evaluation of pictograph.

Figure Captions

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Figure 1. Multinomial Process Tree model of the affect misattribution procedure. In the Response column, “+” signifies a “pleasant” response and “—” signifies an “unpleasant” response.

Figure 2. Proportion of pleasant and unpleasant responses as a function of Prime Pleasantness and Pictograph Duration in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 1 SEM.

Figure 3. Proportion of pleasant and unpleasant responses as a function of Pictograph Pleasantness and Pictograph Duration in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 1 SEM.

Figure 4. Proportion of pleasant and unpleasant responses as a function of Prime Candidate and Pictograph Duration in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 1 SEM.

Figure 5. Proportion of pleasant and unpleasant responses as a function of Pictograph Pleasantness and Pictograph Duration in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 1 SEM.

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Figure 1.






Figure 2.




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Figure 3.




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Figure 4.



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Figure 5.



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